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United States v. O'Hagan: The
Misappropriation Theory Under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5-Can the
Judicial Oak Grow Any Higher?
J. Dormer Stephen III*
I. Introduction
When we deal with ... Rule lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.'
The United States government is a system "of laws, and not of
men."2 In situations where the legislature has spoken through the
enactment of a statute, the judiciary is relegated to interpreting that
law.3 However, as history has shown, the judiciary does not always
reserve the power to enact law to the legislature.4 The courts will
* J. Dormer Stephen III is an attorney with LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae
L.L.P. in Hartford, Connecticut. A graduate of Albany Law School of Union University, Mr.
Stephen served as editor in chief of the Albany Law Review. This article has benefitted from
the comments of Erin S. Dufek, Chester L. Fisher, III, and Gary S. Hammersmith.
1. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). But see DONALD E.
LIVELY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED 75-76 (1990) (suggesting
that courts are "attuned and responsive ... to majoritarian preferences").
3. The Constitution of the United Sates of America grants "all legislative Powers" to
Congress, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, while reserving "all judicial Powers" to the Supreme
Court and all inferior courts created by Congress. See id. art. III, § 1. "Legislative Powers"
has been construed to mean the power to enact statutes and does not include the power to
control their implementation or interpretation. The Supreme Court has expressly construed
the judiciary's power under article III as limited. "Judicial power is never exercised for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to
the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." Osburn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
4. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 5 (1990). Judge Bork states:
[Jiudges must consider themselves bound by law that is independent of their own
views of the desirable. They must not make or apply any policy not fairly to be
found in the Constitution or a statute. It is of course true that judges to some
extent must make law every time they decide a case, but it is minor interstitial
lawmaking.
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occasionally take it upon themselves to render decisions that are
contrary to relevant statutory language or legislative intent.5
"When courts interpret statutes, they should engage in principled
line drawing to determine whether a particular statute applies in a
particular context."6
Id. See also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-43 (1982)
(posing the theory that judicial activism is a vehicle for validating anachronistic laws);
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 30-32 (1949) (discussing the
occasional abuse of power by a court when it imposes a different meaning upon the statutory
intention of Congress); LIVELY, supra note 2, at 49-70 (suggesting that judicial activism is an
inevitable fact of political reality since the text, legislative history, and structure of the law
are often equivocal or uncertain). See generally REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975) (advocating the need for developing an adequate
theory on how to read and apply statutes, thus minimizing the extent of judicial lawmaking);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
5. See Michael P. Kenny & Theresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to
Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L.
REV. 139, 141 (1995) ("The words of a statute must necessarily constrain courts when they
engage in this process, otherwise, they simply substitute arbitrary normative expressions of
personal preference for any semblance of legislative intent."). See also United States v.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 959 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[Iln securities law, as in all areas of the law, our
perceptions of what is wise or fair are ultimately of no relevance. In the end, we, as judges,
no less than anyone else, are bound by the actual prohibitions enacted by Congress.");
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962) (stating that "judicial
review is a deviant institution in the American democracy"); BORK, supra note 4, at 262
(opining that "law is being seduced by politics and is thereby losing its integrity as a
discipline. If it continues on this course, law will cease to be what Holmes named it, calling
for thinkers, and become merely the province of emoters and sensitives." (citing Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Profession of the Law, in SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 22
(1913)); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 30 (1985) (stating that "it seems
axiomatic that the words of a statute-and not the legislators' intent as such-must be the
crucial elements both in the statute's legal force and in its proper interpretation"); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 59, 63 (1988) (opining that the judicial interpretation of statutes can often result in the
creation of "laws" that could not have been passed by the legislature); Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800,
809-10 (1983) (noting that disagreement during the legislative drafting process can result in
vague legislative intent); James D. Redwood, Toward a More Enlightened Securites
Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court? Don't Bank on It Anytime Soon, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 3
(1995) (discussing the Supreme Court's lexicographic method of deciding securities cases in
light of the Central Bank decision); Joseph Dormer Stephen, Criminal Law - Felony Murder,
Duty to Charge Inferior Degrees of the Crime Charged, 6 ALB. L. REV. 72 (1937) (comparing
criminal statutes and their legislative purpose with judicial interpretations thereof); J. Dormer
Stephen III, Gustafson: One Small Step (Backward) for Private Plaintiffs, One Giant Leap
(Backward) for the Securities Bar, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 425 (1996) (discussing the Supreme
Court's misguided statutory interpretation of section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933).
6. Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 5, at 141. See also Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168
(1925) ("[W]here to draw the line ... is the question in pretty much everything worth
arguing in the law.").
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 (the
"Exchange Act") and rule 10b-5,8 promulgated thereunder, are
examples of statutes which courts should interpret utilizing
"principled line drawing." Although the Supreme Court has
restricted the ambit of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,9 in its most
recent decision, United States v. O'Hagan,1° the Court has broad-
ened the scope of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 beyond the statutory
language, legislative intent, and established Supreme Court
precedent relating to such provisions, thereby magnifying the size
of the section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 "judicial oak."
Although there is no express statutory proscription for the
purchase or sale of securities based on material, nonpublic
information, section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have been used to
regulate such purchase or sale." Under the "traditional" or
"classical theory" of insider trading liability, a violation of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 occurs when an "insider"' 2 purchases or sells
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
9. First, the plaintiff must be an actual purchaser or seller of securities. See Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). In addition, the defendant must act with
scienter. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring that the defendant
act with scienter); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.) (requiring the plaintiff to state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind). Reliance is required in
an action based on a material misrepresentation rather than a material omission. See
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The reliance requirement can
be satisfied in material misrepresentation situations by establishing a "fraud on the market"
theory. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). A plaintiff must also successfully
prove causation. There are two strands contained in the causation requirement: transaction
causation and loss causation. Transaction causation requires the plaintiff to prove that the
misrepresentation caused the plaintiff to engage in the transaction. Loss causation requires
the plaintiff to prove that the misrepresentation or omission caused the plaintiff to suffer
economic damages. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974)
(holding that plaintiffs asserting an action based on an omission, rather than a material
misrepresentation, must only plead loss causation).
10. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
11. See discussion infra notes 37-221. Securities and Exchange Commission rule 14e-3,
however, expressly prohibits the purchase or sale of a security based on material, nonpublic
information regarding a tender offer. See 17 CFR § 240.14e-3 (1997). See also discussion
infra note 137.
12. There are two classifications of "insiders," traditional insiders and temporary
insiders. A traditional insider is the issuer or a director or officer of-or a person
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with-the issuer. See AM. LAW INST.,
FED. SEC. CODE § 1603 (1980); see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 4.1 (19xx)
(analyzing the fiduciary duties of an insider). A temporary insider is an underwriter,
attorney, accountant, or other consultant who is exposed to confidential information in his
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his or her corporation's securities on the basis of material,
nonpublic information obtained as a result of the insider's relation-
ship with the corporation. 3 Under the complementary "misappro-
priation theory," a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 occurs
when an "outsider"14 purchases or sells a security on the basis of
material, nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed
to the source of the information."i
A division among the circuit courts had developed concerning
the viability of asserting liability for insider trading based on the
misappropriation theory. 6 The Supreme Court resolved this
dispute in United States v. O'Hagan7 by holding that the misap-
or her relationship with the principal. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14. The Court
stated:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis
for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they entered into a special
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are
given access to information solely for corporate purposes.
Id.
13. See discussion infra notes 37-92; see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating
State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1189 (1995) (presenting a general discussion regarding insider trading). The Eleventh
Circuit recently concluded that a defendant must "use," not merely possess, material,
nonpublic information to constitute a violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. See SEC v.
Adler, _ (11 Cir., March 27, 1998) ("[W]hen an insider trades while in possession of
material nonpublic information, a strong inference arises that such information was used by
the insider in trading. The insider can attempt to rebut the inference.").
14. An outsider is any person that does not qualify as an "insider." See supra note 12
and accompanying text.
15. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207; see also discussion infra notes 93-221. See generally
Jill E. Fisch, An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179,
187 (1991) (noting the difference between the traditional/classical theory and the
misappropriation theory); Sean P. Leuba, The Fourth Circuit Court Breaks Ranks in United
States v. Bryan: Finally a Repudiation of the Misappropriation Theory, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1143 (1996) (providing an overview of the misappropriation theory).
16. For cases holding that the "misappropriation theory" is a valid basis for insider
trading liability, see United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 1004 (1992); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071
(1992); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024
(2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); and SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
For cases holding that the "misappropriation theory" is not a valid basis for insider
trading liability, see United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
2199 (1997) and United States v. O'Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 1996).
17. 117 S. Ct. at 2199.
[Vol. 102:2
THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
propriation theory is a valid theory of liability for insider trading
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.18
This article begins with the historical development of insider
trading liability under the federal securities laws in Part II. Part III
discusses the evolution of the traditional or classical theory of
insider trading liability. Part IV addresses the evolution of the
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability. Part V provides
an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
O'Hagan 9 Finally, Part VI discusses and analyzes the future of
insider trading liability and the ramifications of the O'Hagan
decision.
II. The Historical Development of Insider Trading Laws
When the stock market crashed in 1929, it brought the
"regulatory scheme" of the securities industry crumbling down with
it. President Franklin D. Roosevelt began picking up the pieces of
this devastating blow to the nation's economy by staunchly
advocating reform in the stock exchanges, the issuance of securities,
and securities trading.2° Congress responded to President Roose-
velt's initiatives by enacting the Securities Act of 193321 (the
"Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 193422 (the
"Exchange Act") in order to restore stability to the nation's
financial markets.23
The Securities Act has two basic objectives: to provide
investors with material information concerning the issuance of new
securities to the public and to prohibit the fraudulent sale of
securities. 24 The Securities Act provides investors with protection
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See H.R. REP. NO. 85, at 2 (1933) (President's message of March 23, 1933 to House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce). But see LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1-8 (3d ed. 1995) (arguing that the Securities
Act did not grow out of President Roosevelt's New Deal but rather evolved from "a genera-
tion of state regulation and several centuries of legislation in England").
21. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj.
23. Congress continued to enact additional regulatory legislation for the securities
industry. See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6;
Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 1-65,15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64; Investment Advisors
Act of 1940 §§ 201-222, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21; Trust Indenture Act of 1939 §§ 301-
328, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb.
24. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (7th ed. 1992). For
a thorough discussion on the purpose of the Securities Act and a "behind-the-scenes" look
1998]
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from the failure to comply with these disclosure requirements
through the creation of private rights of action. The Exchange
Act regulates all facets of public trading of securities and prohibits
fraudulent activity in connection with such trading.26  The Ex-
change Act provides investors with private rights of action for
failure to comply with these regulations.
27
One abuse that Congress was interested in curtailing through
the enactment of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act was
"insider trading." 28  The Securities Act contains a provision,
at the drafting of this legislation see James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959).
25. The Securities Act provides express private rights of action. The Supreme Court
has identified three express liability provisions under the Securities Act. See Musick, Peeler
& Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 2xx (1993). The express private rights of action
provisions are: Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (imposing liability for
misstatements or omissions in a registration statement); Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771 (imposing liability for the sale of unregistered securities or fraud in the sale of
securities); and Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (imposing liability on control
persons).
26. See generally Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214 (1959).
27. The Exchange Act provides both express and implied private rights of action. The
Supreme Court has identified five express liability provisions under the Exchange Act. See
Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 508 U.S. at 296-97. These express private rights of action
provisions are: Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (imposing liability for
manipulations of exchange traded securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16,15 U.S.C.
§ 78p (imposing liability for "short-swing" profits); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15
U.S.C. § 78r (imposing liability for misleading statements in reports filed with the Securities
Exchange Commission); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (imposing
liability on control persons); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20A, 15 U.S.C. 78t-1 (impos-
ing insider trading liability).
Courts have also created implied private rights of action under the Exchange Act. See
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, (1977) (implying a private cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) and rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1994) (imposing
liability for fraud in connection with a tender offer)); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964) (implying a private cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) and rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (imposing liability for fraud in
connection with the solicitation of a proxy statement)); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (a implying a private cause of action under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (imposing
liability for employing any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security)).
28. Prior to the enactment of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, common law
fraud and the mail fraud statute served, respectively, as the civil remedy and the criminal law
proscription.
The failure to disclose material information was actionable under common law only
in narrow factual circumstances. One such circumstance occurred if the undisclosed
information could not be discovered upon reasonable diligence or investigation or some
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section 17(a), that prohibits the use of fraud in the sale of securi-
ties.29 Although section 17(a) of the Securities Act could be
interpreted as applying to purchasers of securities, the Securities
Exchange Commission (the "SEC") confines its enforcement efforts
to actions against sellers of securities.
30
The Exchange Act contains a "catchall," general antifraud
provision, section 10(b), that prohibits the use or employment, in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, of any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the SEC may prescribe for the protection
of investors. 31  In 1942, the SEC utilized its rulemaking authority
confidential or fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1965); W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and
Nondisclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1936).
The mail fraud statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository
for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal
Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly
causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place
at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). Section 17(a) states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-(1) to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or pro-
perty by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, as originally enacted, was limited to the sale of
securities. In 1954, Congress amended section 17 (a) by adding "offer or" to the statute. See
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
30. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.2, at 457 (3d
ed. 1995); Louis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3410 (1991).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 10(b) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
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under section 10(b) by promulgating rule 10b-5.3 2  Rule 10b-5
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Rule lOb-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
Although rule 10b-5 was patterned upon section 17(a) of the Securities Act, it
extended the anti-fraud regulation to purchasers of securities in addition to the existing
regulation of sellers of securities. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the
applicability of section 17(a) to sellers of securities only); see also HAZEN, supra note 30,
§ 13.2, at 458. According to Milton Freeman, the decision to pattern rule 10b-5 on section
17(a) apparently did not involve thorough consideration:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the
S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was
then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just
been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional
Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some
company in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company from
his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the
company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quad-
rupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do
about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at
Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only
discussion we had there was where "in connection with the purchase or sale"
should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't
remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece
of paper around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule
and they tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except
Summer Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That
is how it happened.
Milton Freeman, Remarks Before the Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
Although section 17(a) of the Securities Act was intended to parallel rule 10b-5, there
are three considerable distinctions:
First, Rule lob-5 applies to any "purchase or sale" of a security, whereas Section
17(a) covers the "offer or sale" of any security. Second, Section 17(a) does not
contain the phrase "manipulative or deceptive device" that is found in Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and has formed a basis of the scienter and deceptive
requirements. Third, by virtue of the jurisdictional provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts, the federal courts are vested with exclusive jurisdiction over Rule lOb-5
1998] THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
makes it unlawful for any person to commit a fraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.33
Although neither section 17(a) of the Securities Act nor
section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act expressly prohibits
the purchase or sale of a security based on material,34 nonpublic
information35 , section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have been judicially
interpreted to prohibit such "insider trading. 3 6 The courts have
developed two distinct theories of liability for insider trading under
section 10(b)/rule 10b-5, the traditional or classical theory and the
misappropriation theory.
III. The Traditional Theory of Insider Trading Liability Under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Although there is no legislative proscription for the purchase
or sale of securities based on material, nonpublic information,
actions while Section 17(a) actions may be brought either in state or federal court
with no right of removal from state to federal court.
HAZEN, supra note 30, § 13.13, at 652.
33. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
34. Information is material if there is a "substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 (1988) (adopting
the materiality test set forth in TSC Indus. for section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 actions and
stating that "materiality depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on
the withheld or misrepresented information"). For a list of cases, each of which applies the
materiality test to specific facts and circumstances, see JENNINGS, supra note 24, at 1204-06.
35. Information is nonpublic if "it has not been disseminated in a manner making it
available to investors generally." In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 643 (1971);
see also Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10,174, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,378,
at 83,105 (May 25, 1973) (stating that "[in order to effect a meaningful public disclosure of
corporate information, it must be disseminated in a manner calculated to reach the securities
market place in general through recognized channels of distribution, and public investors
must be allocated a reasonable waiting period to react to the information"); Victor Brudney,
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 322, 322 n.2 (1979) (stating that nonpublic information "refers to information that
investors may not lawfully acquire without the consent of the source"). "It also includes
information which, although it may be disseminated, is not yet generally available." Id.
36. "Insider trading" has been defined by one commentator as:
[A] term of art which has never been statutorily defined by Congress. It is
generally described as unlawful trading in securities by persons who possess
material, nonpublic information about a company whose shares are traded on any
securities market. The term, as it exists today, is arguably a misnomer since
liability under the securities laws can extend to those who are not insiders, as that
term is commonly understood ....
John I. McMahon, Jr., Note, A Statutory Definition of Insider Trading: The Need to Codify
the Misappropriation Theory, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 985, 986 n.4 (1988).
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section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have been used to enforce violations
of such trading activity. Under the traditional or classical theory of
insider trading liability, a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
occurs when an insider purchases or sells his or her corporation's
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information obtained
as a result of the insider's relationship with the corporation.37
A. In re Cady, Roberts & Co.
The seminal decision in the development of insider trading
liability under section 10(b) was rendered in the 1961 SEC hearing,
In re Cady, Roberts & Co.38  Cady, Roberts involved a broker-
dealer and partner of Cady, Roberts, Robert Gintel, who executed
sell orders for Curtiss-Wright Corporation common stock for
discretionary accounts after receiving material, nonpublic informa-
tion regarding the Curtiss-Wright dividend reduction.39 The
source of the nonpublic information was J. Cheever Cowdin, a
director of Curtiss-Wright and a registered representative of Cady,
Roberts.4" At a board of directors meeting in November 1961, the
directors approved a fifty percent reduction in the company's
quarterly dividend rate.4" Cowdin divulged the dividend reduction
information to Gintel at Cady, Roberts before the information had
reached the market.42 Upon receipt of the information and in
anticipation that such information would adversely affect the value
of the Curtiss-Wright common stock when revealed, Gintel sold
seven thousand shares of Curtis-Wright common stock.43 When
37. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2202 (1997); Arthur Fleisher et al.,
An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
798, 804-05 (1973) (discussing the requisite relationships under rule 10b-5); see also discussion
infra notes 37-92 (discussing the paramount decisions regarding the traditional theory of
insider trading liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5).
38. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
39. See id. at 909.
40. See id. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating that a director of a
corporation qualifies as an "insider").
41. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 909.
42. See id.
43. See id. Gintel executed two sell orders. The first transaction was executed to sell
all of the Curtiss-Wright common stock held by discretionary accounts managed by Gintel.
The second transaction was executed as a "short-sale." Id.
Selling short" is defined as "the practice of selling a borrowed security with the
commitment to repurchase it at an unspecified later date .... The short seller
then sells the borrowed security as if he or she owns it .... To close or cover the




the dividend announcement was disclosed to the market, the price
of the Curtiss-Wright common stock declined by over ten per-
cent.44
Based on the stipulated facts, the SEC held Gintel and Cady,
Roberts liable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.4 ' This holding
was based on two principal elements: the existence of a fiduciary
relationship that provided access to information that was intended
solely for internal corporate purposes and the inherent unfairness
involved by utilizing such nonpublic information for personal
gain.46  Even though Gintel was not an insider, the SEC deter-
mined that, by virtue of his registered representative affiliation with
Cowdin, a traditional insider, Gintel had a close enough nexus to
the source of the information to impose a duty upon him to
disclose the information or abstain from trading until the informa-
tion became public.47 The SEC held that since Gintel had not
disclosed the information or abstained from trading securities based
on the information, he had breached the duty of nondisclosure or
abstinence which qualifies under rule lOb-5 as a deceptive device
or scheme or engaging in a fraudulent or deceptive act or prac-
tice.48 The SEC, by combining this deceptive device/fraudulent act
and the purchase or sale of securities, established liability for
insider trading violations based on section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.49
THE NEW DICTIONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE 445 (Peter Newman et al., 1992).
44. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 910. The precipitous drop in the price of the Curtiss-
Wright common stock resulted in an immediate pecuniary gain for Gintel. In addition to
avoiding a loss on the common stock held in the discretionary accounts before the
information was disseminated to the public, Gintel had an instantaneous unrecognized gain
on the short sale transactions. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
45. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911.
46. See id. at 912. The Commission stated: "Thus our task here is to identify those
persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs, and
thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest
the uninformed be exploited." Id.
47. See id. Although the SEC indirectly or inadvertently discussed insider trading
liability based upon the "tipper-tipee" relationship that existed in Cady, Roberts, the parlance
"tipper-tipee" was not used or fully explored until the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See discussion infra notes 75-92 (discussing the Dirks decision and
the concept of a transferred duty); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the
Misappropriation Theory and the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to
Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L. REV. 775, 794 (opining that Gintel did not owe a duty to
disclose because a fiduciary relationship did not exist).
48. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
49. See id. The Commission further noted that:
[Wie, and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material
facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known
1998]
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B. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.
The "disclose or abstain" rule introduced in Cady, Roberts was
further developed in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co."° In Texas
Gulf Sulfur, several officers and directors of Texas Gulf Sulfur
Company purchased a vast amount of common stock in Texas Gulf
based on material nonpublic information that Texas Gulf had
discovered a significant amount of valuable natural resources in one
of Texas Gulf's properties.51 After news of Texas Gulf's valuable
discovery was disseminated to the public, the price of Texas Gulf
common stock more than doubled, and the officers and directors
sold their common stock for a sizable profit.5 2
The court held that the inside officers and directors had
violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by purchasing the Texas Gulf
common stock based on material, nonpublic information.53 The
decision in Texas Gulf Sulfur, however, provided vital and
nourishing fertilizer for the rule 10b-5 judicial oak. The Second
Circuit expanded the scope of insider trading liability under section
10(b)/rule 10b-5 by focusing on the possession of the material,
nonpublic information without regard to the possessor's duty or
relationship to the company or the source of the information."
to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their
investment judgment. Failure to make disclosure in these circumstances
constitutes a violation of [section 10(b) and rule lob-5]. If, on the other hand,
disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic
under the circumstances,... the alternative is to forgo the transaction.
Id. at 911. This SEC position became known as the "disclose or abstain" rule. See David
C. Bayne, The Insider's Natural-Law Duty: "Disclose or Abstain?", 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 75,
76 (1993); Alison G. Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV.
341, 342 (1982) (discussing the "disclose or abstain" rule).
50. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Bayne, supra note 49 (providing an analysis
of the Texas Gulf Sulfur decision and its impact on the development of insider trading
liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5).
51. See Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d at 843-46.
52. See id. at 847. The price of the common stock was approximately $17 per share
before the discovery and approximately $37 per share after the public announcement of the
discovery. See id.
53. See id. at 851-52.
54. See id. at 848 (noting that "[i]nsiders, as directors or management officers are, of
course, by [rule 10b-5], precluded from so unfairly dealing, but the Rule is also applicable
to one possessing the information who may not be strictly termed an 'insider' within the
meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the [Exchange Act]"). The scope of section 16 of the Exchange Act
encompasses
every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per
centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which
1998] THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
Instead of examining the breach of an insider's duty to the related
corporation, the court focused on the importance of prohibiting
inequities in the securities market.55 Under the Second Circuit's
analysis, an outsider who overhears a conversation between two
insiders of a corporation regarding material, nonpublic information
and purchases or sells that corporation's securities based upon such
information, could have been prosecuted by the SEC for violating
rule 10b-5.56
The presence of two different precedents created confusion in
the legal community. On the one hand, the SEC viewed the
is registered pursuant to Section 12 of [the Exchange Act] or who is a director or
an officer of the issuer of such security ....
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994).
55. In arriving at this determination, the court explored a portion of the legislative
history of the Exchange Act:
The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing
judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a
situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as
artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open market, so the
hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the
markets as indices of real value. There cannot be honest markets without honest
publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon
mystery and secrecy. The disclosure of information materially important to
investors may not instantaneously be reflected in market value, but despite the
intricacies of security values truth does find relatively quick acceptance on the
market. That is why in many cases it is so carefully guarded. Delayed, inaccurate,
and misleading reports are the tools of the unconscionable market operator and
the recreant corporate official who speculate on inside information. Despite the
tug of conflicting interests and the influence of popular groups, responsible
officials of the leading exchanges have unqualifiedly recognized in theory at least
the vital importance of true and accurate corporate reporting as an essential cog
in the proper functioning of the public exchanges. Their efforts to bring about
more adequate and prompt publicity have been handicapped by the lack of legal
power and by the failure of certain banking and business groups to appreciate that
a business that gathers its capital from the investing public has not the same right
to secrecy as a small privately owned and managed business. It is only a few
decades since men believed that the disclosure of a balance sheet was a disclosure
of a trade secret. Today few people would admit the right of any company to
solicit public funds without the disclosure of a balance sheet.
Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d at 858-59 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1934)).
56. The Second Circuit stated:
Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect
a corporate confidence, or if he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading
in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information
remains undisclosed.
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"deceptive device" or "fraudulent act" element in a rule 10b-5
action for insider trading as the breach of a fiduciary duty.57 On
the other hand, the Second Circuit held that the "deceptive device"
or "fraudulent act" element in a rule 10b-5 action for insider
trading was based on the possessor's breach of a duty to the
purchasers or sellers in the securities market.58 This confusion,
inter alia, prompted the Supreme Court to render its first insider
trading decision based upon section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.59
C. Chiarella v. United States
The Supreme Court first addressed the imposition of insider
trading liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in Chiarella v.
United States.6 In Chiarella, the Court embraced the decision in
Cady, Roberts insofar as it addressed when a duty existed and how
the breach of such duty would violate section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5.61 The Court also implicitly rejected the rationale in Texas Gulf
Sulfur because, unlike Texas Gulf Sulfur, the Court required the
existence of a fiduciary relationship or duty between the possessor
of the information and the issuer of the securities, apart from the
mere possession of the material, nonpublic information.62
Chiarella was an employee of a financial printer.63 Among
the documents that Chiarella handled were five announcements
regarding corporate takeover plans. 4 Although the identity of the
corporations involved in the takeover plans were intentionally
concealed, Chiarella was able to discern the identity of the target
corporations. 65  Without disclosing the information, Chiarella
purchased stock in the target corporations.66 After the takeover
57. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
59. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
60. Id. See also David C. Bayne, The Insider's Natural Law Duty: Chiarella and the
"Fiduciary" Fallacy, 19 J. CORP. L. 681 (1994) (providing an analysis of the Chiarella decision
and its impact on insider trading liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5).
61. See Chiaralla, 455 U.S. at 227-29.
62. See id. at 227. "[O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so." Id.
at 228.
63. See id. at 224.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
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information was divulged to the public, Chiarella sold the stock and
realized a profit.67
The Court, in reversing the conviction of Chiarella, focused
on the requirement of a duty to disclose the material, nonpublic
information. After examining the language and the legislative
history of section 10(b), the Court refused to recognize "a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo
actions based on material, nonpublic information. ' '68 Consequent-
ly, the Court held that failure to disclose material, nonpublic
information would constitute a violation of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 only if the defendant had a duty to disclose the information
and the duty emanated from a fiduciary relationship apart from the
mere possession of such information. 69 Even though Chiarella had
obtained material, nonpublic information and purchased securities
based on such knowledge, the Court held that, absent a duty to
disclose, Chiarella could not be convicted of an insider trading
violation under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5.7"
Although the majority in Chiarella did not address the issue of
whether Chiarella breached a duty to the acquiring corporation by
purchasing stock of the target corporations based upon material,
nonpublic information that he obtained as a result of his employ-
ment at the financial printer employed by the acquiring corporation
since the issue was not submitted to the jury, Chief Justice Burger,
nonetheless, decided to address the issue in his dissenting opin-
ion.7 Chief Justice Burger's legendary dissenting opinion in
67. See id.
68. Id. at 233.
69. See id. at 235.
70. See id. at 232-33. The district court and the court of appeals failed to identify a
relationship between Chiarella and the sellers of the stock that could establish a duty. See
id. at 231-32. If, however, Chiarella had purchased or sold securities of the acquiring
corporation, instead of the target corporations, his conviction might have been affirmed. If
the acquiring corporation could have been found to have employed the financial printer,
Chiarella probably would have been a "temporary insider" of the acquiring corporation
imposing a recognizable duty upon Chiarella to the acquiring corporation and its
shareholders. See supra note 12 (defining "temporary insiders"). See also Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
71. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-36, 239-52 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Although Chief
Justice Burger was the only dissenting vote in Chiarella, he was not the only member to
address the legitimacy of the misappropriation theory. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
adopted Burger's legal analysis but decided not to join Burger's dissent because the issue was
not presented to the jury. See id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger's
dissent "correctly states the applicable substantive law-a person violates § 10(b) whenever
he improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then
19981
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Chiarella established the foundation for the "misappropriation
theory" of insider trading liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5.
Chief Justice Burger started his dissent with the tenet that a
party to an arm's length business transaction does not have an
obligation to any other party to that transaction unless the parties
have a confidential or fiduciary relationship.72  However, he
recognized that this tenet "should give way when an informational
advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or
industry, but by some unlawful means., 73  Chief Justice Burger
applied this principle to the purchase and sale of securities and
concluded that "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic
information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to
refrain from trading., 74  The establishment of this "misappropria-
tion theory" by Chief Justice Burger, although rejected by the
majority opinion, was subsequently utilized by the SEC as one
more weapon in the arsenal to enforce insider trading violations.
75
D. Dirks v. SEC
Although the Supreme Court addressed insider trading liability
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in Chiarella, it subsequently
granted certiorari in Dirks v. SEC76 and broadened the scope of
uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities." Id. Justice Stevens also
concurred with the majority opinion but stated that the Court did not approve of Chiarella's
actions and left open the possibility that such actions might be a violation of section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 in the future. See id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). He stated: "I think the
Court wisely leaves the resolution of this issue for another day. I write simply to emphasize
the fact that we have not necessarily placed any stamp of approval on what [Chiarella] did,
nor have we held that similar actions must be considered lawful in the future." Id.
72. See id. at 239-40 (citing WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 106 (2d ed. 1955)).
Chief Justice Burger rationalizes this tenet because "it provides incentive for hard work,
careful analysis, and astute forecasting." Id. at 240.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 1196 (discussing how the misappropriation
theory blossomed from the seeds Chief Justice Burger planted in his dissent in Chiarella).
75. As used in the discussion of Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella, the term
"insider trading" is purely a misnomer. Burger's theory of insider trading liability was not
limited to insiders. In fact, in the opinion of this author, Chief Justice Burger's theory of
insider trading liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 was not limited in any sense of
the word. See discussion infra notes 95-137 (discussing the progeny of cases based on the
dissent in Chiarella).
76. 436 U.S. 646 (1983).
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insider trading liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.77 The
defendant-petitioner, Dirks, was an officer of a broker-dealer firm
that provided investment analysis of the insurance industry to
institutional investors.7" Dirks was informed by a former employ-
ee of Equity Funding of America that the assets of Equity Funding
were vastly overstated as a result of fraudulent practices.79 Dirks
interviewed several officers and employees of Equity Funding, and
some employees confirmed the allegations.80 Although neither
Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any Equity Funding securities,
Dirks discussed the information that he obtained during his
investigation with numerous clients and investors.8 Some of these
clients and investors sold Equity Funding securities.82 Dirks was
subsequently convicted of aiding and abetting the sellers of Equity
Funding securities based on material, nonpublic information under,
inter alia, section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.8
The Supreme Court reversed Dirks' conviction.' The Court
reaffirmed the holding in Cady, Roberts with respect to traditional
insiders;85 traditional insiders have a fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion's shareholders and, therefore, must either disclose the material,
nonpublic information or refrain from trading securities based on
such information.86 The Court also reaffirmed the holding in
Chiarella; a duty to disclose material, nonpublic information arises
out of a fiduciary relationship and not the mere possession of such
information.'
77. See id. See also Bayne, supra note 60 (providing an analysis of the Dirks decision
and its impact on insider trading liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5).
78. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648.
79. See id. at 649.
80. See id.
81. See id. Dirks also contacted the Wall Street Journal and urged the Journal to publish
an article based on his investigation; the Journal declined to publish the article. See id. at
649-50.
82. See id. During the two-week period in which Dirks conducted his investigation of
Equity Funding and informed his clients of his discoveries, the price of Equity Funding stock
plunged from $26 per share to less than $15 per share. See id.
83. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650-51. Dirks was also convicted of violating section 17(a)
of the Securities Act. See id. at 650.
84. See id. at 652.
85. See supra note 12 (defining the scope of traditional insiders).
86. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652; see also supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text
(discussing Cady, Roberts).
87. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58; see also supra notes 58-73 and accompanying text
(discussing Chiarella).
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The SEC urged the Court to uphold Dirks' conviction based
on a theory that Dirks, as a tipee,s8 upon receipt of material,
nonpublic information from an insider, "inherited" the insider's
duty to either disclose such information or abstain from trading.89
The Court, however, rejected this argument and stated:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only
when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the share-
holders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.'
Thus, a tippee can be convicted of insider trading under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 if: (1) the insider/tipper breaches a fiduciary
duty to the shareholders of the corporation by virtue of his or her
disclosure of material, nonpublic information to the tippee and (2)
the tippee knows or should have known that the insider/tipper has
breached a fiduciary duty as a result of the disclosure and the
tippee purchases or sells securities based on such information.91
88. A "tipee" is an outsider that receives material, nonpublic information from an
insider. A "tipper" is the insider that provided the tippee with such information. See Dirks,
463 U.S. at 654-60.
89. See id. at 655-56. The Court stated:
In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty which he had assumed as a
result of knowingly receiving confidential information from [Equity Funding]
insiders. Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public, material information from
insiders become "subject to the same duty as [the] insiders." Such a tippee
breaches the fiduciary duty which he assumes from the insider when the tippee
knowingly transmits the information to someone who will probably trade on the
basis thereof .... Presumably, Dirks' informants were entitled to disclose the
[Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and its perpetrators to justice.
However, Dirks-standing in their shoes-committed a breach of the fiduciary
duty which he had assumed in dealing with them, when he passed the information
on to traders.
Id. (quoting 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1410, n.42 (citations omitted)).
90. Id. at 660.
91. See id. The Court's analysis apparently allows an outsider that obtains material,
nonpublic information from an insider to purchase or sell securities based on such
information in a situation where the insider has not breached a duty to the corporation by
such disclosure. For example, an insider may provide material, nonpublic information to a
financial analyst or investment banker, in the course of his or her fiduciary responsibilities
to the corporation, and the analyst or banker may, under the Court's analysis in Dirks,
purchase or sell securities without violating section 10(b) or rule lOb-5. But see supra note
12 (discussing "temporary insiders," which creates the possibility that such analyst or banker
may be a "temporary insider" and, therefore, exposed to insider trading liability as an insider
rather than a tippee); see also SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), affirming 638 F.
Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984); SEC v.
Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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The Court enunciated a test for determining whether the disclosure
by the insider constituted a breach of a fiduciary duty; "the test is
whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly,
from his disclosure.,
92
The Court, in applying these rules of law, reversed Dirks'
conviction. 93 The Court determined that since the motivation of
the insider/tipper was to expose the fraudulent conduct and that the
disclosure of the material, nonpublic information did not personally
benefit the insider/tipper, the insider/tipper did not breach a duty
to the shareholders of Equity Funding.94 Absent a breach of duty
by the insider/tipper, there was no derivative breach of duty by the
tippee, Dirks.95
IV. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability
Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
The misappropriation theory of insider trading liability
broadens the scope of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 beyond the
statutory language, legislative intent, and established Supreme
Court precedent of such statutory provisions and has magnified the
size of Chief Justice Rhenquist's proverbial "judicial oak." 96
Under the misappropriation theory, a violation of section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 occurs if an outsider purchases or sells a security on the
basis of material, nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary
duty owed to the source of the information. 97 The most signifi-
cant difference between the traditional theory and the misappropri-
92. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. "Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of
duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach."
Id.; see also SEC v. Grossman, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,518 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding
that the tipper may be required to disgorge the profits obtained by the tippees even though
the tipper did not receive direct funds from the insider trading transactions); Brian Schmidt,
The Broadening of Tippee Liability: No Refuge for the Tippee, 58 UMKC L. REv. 85 (1989).
93. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665.
94. See id. at 666-67.
95. See id. at 667. Of course, no insider trading decision by the Supreme Court is
complete without a liberal dissent. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented
based largely upon the factual overtone. See id. at 667-79.
96. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Steven R. Salbu, The Misap-
propriation Theory of Insider Trading: A Legal, Economic and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 223 (1992) (stating that the misappropriation theory is incorrect from a
legal, economic, and ethical viewpoint). But see Barbara B. Aldave, Misappropriation: A
General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 101
(1984) (stating that the misappropriation theory is a valid basis for liability under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5).
97. See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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ation theory of insider trading liability relates to the "breach of
duty" requirement. A violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
occurs under the traditional theory if an insider breaches a duty to
the corporation of which he or she is an insider; under the
misappropriation theory, a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
occurs if the purchaser or seller of a security breaches any fiduciary
duty related to the acquisition of the material, nonpublic informa-
tion. Thus, misappropriation theory jurisprudence has magnified
the scope of insider trading liability under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5.
A. United States v. Newman
In United States v. Newman,98 the Second Circuit employed
the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability explored in
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella.99 The defendant,
Newman, a securities trader at a brokerage firm, received material,
nonpublic information regarding mergers, acquisitions, and tender
offers from employees at two different investment banks."'
Newman purchased stock in the companies that were merger or
takeover targets and sold the stock for a large gain after the
information became public.01' Newman would then share the
profits with the two sources of the information. °2 The United
States indicted Newman, inter alia, for violations of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5; however, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the indictment.1 0 3 The
Second Circuit, employing Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
Chiarella, reversed the district court and reinstated the indict-
ment. 04
The court determined that it needed to "spend little time on
the issue of fraud and deceit.' '0 5  Since the employees of the
investment banks and their co-conspirators damaged the investment
banks and their clients, Newman and the employees defrauded the
98. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
99. See id. at 15-19. Newman was rendered by the Second Circuit after the Supreme
Court's decision in Chiarella but before the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks. See Dirks,
463 U.S. at 646; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
100. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 15.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 14.
104. See id. at 14-16.
105. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
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investment banks."° After the court found that the element of
fraud was satisfied, it moved to a brief examination of the "in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities" element.'
0 7
Since the employees of the investment banks had divulged the
material, nonpublic information with the objective of directing the
purchases of securities by Newman, the court determined that the
fraud sufficiently "touched" the securities transactions to constitute
violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. °8
Although the Newman decision did not expressly use the
phrase "misappropriation theory," the court's analysis articulated
the misappropriation theory. The court held that violations of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 occurred without a breach of a duty to
the shareholders of the companies whose securities were being
purchased; the court instead determined that a breach of a duty to
the source of the material, nonpublic information was sufficient to
impose liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, thus broadening
the scope of potential insider trading violations under such
statutes.t°9
B. United States v. Carpenter
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v.
Carpenter," it appeared inevitable that the Court would address
the validity of the misappropriation theory. The factual scenario
in Carpenter provided an archetypal misappropriation theory
setting. R. Foster Winans, the author of the "Heard on the Street"
column at the Wall Street Journal, and David Carpenter, a news
clerk for the Journal, were involved in a fraudulent scheme in
which they would inform two brokers of the upcoming subjects of
the "Heard on the Street" column before publication."' Upon
106. See id.
107. See id. at 18.
108. See id. at 18. "[T]he language of Rule 10b-5 ... contains no specific requirement
that fraud be perpetrated upon the seller or buyer of securities." Id. at 17; see also David
C. Bayne, The Insider's Natural-Law Duty: Chestman and the "Misappropriation Theory,"
43 U. KAN. L. REv. 79, 87-88 (1994) (noting that the misappropriation theory is based on
fraud committed against the source of the material, nonpublic information rather than the
corresponding party to the securities transaction).
109. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17-19. In SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985), the Second Circuit affirmed the misappropriation theory
as a valid theory of insider trading liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. See id.
110. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
111. See id. at 1026. The trial court, in addressing the issue of the materiality of the
information contained in the column, determined that such information "does have an impact
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receipt of such material, nonpublic information, the brokers would
purchase or sell securities of the companies that were the subject
of the upcoming column.1 2 This scheme resulted in a recognized
gain of approximately $690,000.113 The SEC uncovered the
trading scheme and charged the conspirators with, inter alia,
violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. t4 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted the
defendants based upon the misappropriation theory."5
The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions based on the
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability.11 6 The court
determined that the defendants, Winans and Carpenter, had a
fiduciary obligation to preserve the integrity and confidentiality of
the information obtained as a result of their employment with the
Journal."7 The court found that the defendants, upon divulging
the information to outside parties, had breached their fiduciary
obligation to the Journal."8 Since the defendants had misappro-
priated the material, nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary
obligation for their own personal use, the court concluded that such
misappropriation constituted the "fraud or deceit" as required
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.1 9 Finally, the court deter-
mined that since the defendants had purchased and sold securities
based upon the misappropriated information, the requisite "in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities" element was
satisfied. 2 ° The Supreme Court, on review of the trial court
decision and the Second Circuit affirmation, was evenly divided on
the federal securities law violations and did not discuss the
misappropriation theory.
21
on the market, difficult though it may be to quantify in any particular case." United States
v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). It should also be noted that the Journal
had a confidentiality agreement with each employee with regard to pre-published
information. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23.
112. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1027.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1025.
115. See id. at 1026.
116. See id. at 1027-34.
117. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1028.
118. See id. at 1026-34.
119. See id. at 1031 (noting that "it is sufficient that the fraud was committed upon [the
defendants'] employer").
120. See id. at 1032-33.
121. United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (stating that "the Court is evenly
divided with respect to the convictions under the securities laws and for that reason affirms
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C. United States v. Chestman
The Second Circuit revisited the misappropriation theory of
insider trading liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in United
States v. Chestman.l2 Ira Waldbaum agreed to sell his controlling
interest in Waldbaum, Inc. to the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company at a price of fifty dollars per share.'23 Waldbaum
informed his children, including his daughter Shirley Witkin, of the
impending sale but "cautioned them 'that [the sale] was not to be
discussed,' that it was to remain confidential., 124 Despite Wald-
baum's cautionary directive, Shirley informed her daughter, Susan
Loeb, that Waldbaum was selling the company and, in turn, warned
Susan not to tell anyone except her husband, Keith Loeb, about the
sale."z Susan Loeb informed her husband about the impending
sale and warned him not to tell anyone because disclosure might
jeopardize the sale.126  Upon learning of the sale, Keith Loeb
apprised his broker, Chestman, of the information regarding the
sale and instructed Chestman to purchase shares of Waldbaum
stock for his account. 127  Chestman purchased the Waldbaum
stock for Loeb and also purchased shares of Waldbaum stock for
himself and some client discretionary accounts.1 28 The announce-
ment of the sale was subsequently released to the public and the
price of the Waldbaum stock soared. 29 Chestman was indicted
for, inter alia, a violation of rule 10b-5 based on the misappropria-
tion theory of insider trading liability.13 Following his conviction
at a trial by jury, Chestman appealed to the Second Circuit. 3 '
the judgment below on those counts").
122. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).




127, See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 555.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 556. Loeb agreed to cooperate with the government, disgorged his profits
from the transactions and paid a fine. See id.
131. See id. The court stated:
With respect to the shares Chestman purchased on behalf of Keith Loeb,
Chestman was convicted of aiding and abetting Loeb's misappropriation of
nonpublic information in breach of a duty Loeb owed to the Waldbaum family
and to his wife Susan. As to the shares Chestman purchased for himself and his
other clients, Chestman was convicted as a 'tipee' of that same misappropriated
1998]
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The court began its discussion with an overview of the
traditional and misappropriation theories of liability under rule 10b-
5.132 The court then moved to an examination of fiduciary
relationships, the breach of which constitutes "fraud or deceit"
under the misappropriation theory.133 The court recognized that
"a fiduciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a
person with confidential information.'" 1 34 The court also recog-
nized that a marital relationship does not, by itself, create a
fiduciary relationship. 135 The court proceeded to compile a list of
relationships that have been recognized as "inherently fiduc-
iary. , 131 The court determined that although their list is not
exhaustive, neither the relationship between Keith and Susan Loeb,
nor the relationship between Keith Loeb and the Waldbaum family,
is a traditional fiduciary relationship.
137
The court continued its inquiry because, according to the
misappropriation theory, even if a fiduciary relationship does not
exist, consideration must still be given to whether a "relationship
of trust and confidence" had been established. 131 The court
information. Thus, while Chestman is the defendant in this case, the alleged
misappropriator was Keith Loeb.
Id. at 564.
132. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 564-67.
133. See id. at 567-71; see also William A. Snider, Note, Securities Law-All in the
Family-United States v. Chestman: Finding a Fiduciary or Other Similar Relationship of
Trust and Confidence Under Rule lOb-5 for Family Members of a Family Controlled Publicly
Traded Corporation, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 79 (1994).
134. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567 (citing Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796,
799 (2d Cir. 1980)).
135. See id. at 568. "'[M]ere kinship does not itself establish a confidential relation' ....
Rather, the existence of a confidential relationship must be determined independently of a
preexisting family relationship." Id. (quoting United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 706
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)).
136. Id. The court specified the following as "inherently fiduciary" relationships: attorney
and client, executor and heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent, trustee and beneficiary,
and corporate officer/director and shareholder. See id. (citing Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 704
(citing John C. Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of
Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
117, 150 (1981); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949);
BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979))).
137. See id.
138. Id. The court considered the following characteristics to be present in fiduciary
relationships: reliance, de facto control and dominance, discretionary authority, and
dependency. See id. (citing United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1972), affd, 357 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 370
N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), affd, 358 N.E.2d 882 (N.Y. 1976), reargument denied,
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determined that Keith Loeb did not have a fiduciary relationship
or a relationship of trust and confidence with either his wife Susan
or the Waldbaum family.139 A familial relationship is not suffi-
cient to establish a fiduciary duty and, absent a breach of a
fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, Keith
Loeb could not have committed the requisite fraud or deceit under
the misappropriation theory.140  Accordingly, since Keith Loeb
could not be convicted of committing the predicate act of fraud or
deceit, Chestman could not be derivatively liable as an aider and
abettor or a tippee.' 4' The Second Circuit concluded its decision
by reversing Chestman's convictions under rule 10b-5.142
D. United States v. Bryan
After a series of circuit court decisions' 4 ' and indecision on
behalf of the Supreme Court,' the misappropriation theory was
finally rejected. 4 5 The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Bryan,
declined to assert insider trading liability based on the misappropri-
ation theory under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 46
363 N.E.2d 1194 (N.Y. 1977)).
139. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 570-71.
140. See id. at 571.
141. See id.
142. See id. The Second Circuit also reversed the mail fraud conviction but affirmed
Chestman's conviction under rule 14e-3(a). See id. Rule 14e-3(a) states:
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of Section 14(e) of
the Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating
to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is
nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly
or indirectly from: (1) The offering person, (2) The issuer of the securities sought
or to be sought by such tender offer, or (3) Any officer, director, partner or
employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or such
issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities
or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any
option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless
within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its
source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1997).
143. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
144. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19
(1987); see also supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Carpenter
decision).
145. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
146. See id.
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In 1990, Elton Bryan was appointed director of the West
Virginia Lottery.1 47  Bryan's responsibilities, as director, included
negotiating and securing contracts for the West Virginia Lot-
tery.1 48  Shortly after his appointment, Bryan investigated the
potential expansion of video lottery gaming.'49 After the Lot-
tery's intention to expand video gaming became public, several
video game manufacturers lobbied for the potential business.50
One such manufacturer, Video Lottery Consultants ("VLC"),
promised the Governor of West Virginia that it would locate a
manufacturing facility in West Virginia in exchange for an exclusive
contract to provide video gaming terminals in West Virginia. 51
Bryan purchased shares of VLC stock based on knowledge that
VLC would be awarded the exclusive contract; this contract would,
in turn, enhance the revenues earned by VLC.'52 Bryan was
indicted for, inter alia, violating section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.153
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia convicted Bryan through application of the misappropria-
tion theory of insider trading liability.
1 54
The Fourth Circuit unanimously reversed Bryan's convictions
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. t55 After a review of the other
circuit court and Supreme Court decisions regarding section 10(b),
the Fourth Circuit proceeded to address the misappropriation
theory.156  The court started with an examination of the broad
language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 and determined that the
147. See id. at 937.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 938.
150. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 938.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 936.
154. See id.
155. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945 (concluding "that neither the language of section 10(b),
Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court authority interpreting these provisions, nor the purposes of
the securities fraud prohibitions, will support convictions resting on the particular theory of
misappropriation"). The court did, however, affirm Bryan's convictions for mail fraud, wire
fraud, and perjury. See id. at 936.
156. See id. at 944-45. The court recognized that "[u]nder the misappropriation theory,
the 'fraud' requirement is deemed to be satisfied when a person misappropriates material
nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and
confidence" and that the "source of the nonpublic information need not be a purchaser or
seller of securities, be affiliated with a purchaser or seller, or be in any way connected to or
even interested in the purchase or sale of securities." Id. at 944 (citing and quoting United
States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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language itself, without Supreme Court precedent to the contrary,
could support the misappropriation theory of liability.'57 After
application of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5, however, the court rejected the misappropriation
theory.158
The court first addressed the element of "manipulation and
deception."5 9 It noted that manipulation is "'virtually a term of
art' in the securities context" which references "wash sales,
matched orders or rigged prices, that are 'intended to mislead
investors by artificially affecting market activity.' ' 161 The ques-
tion presented to the court, then, was whether section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5's "prohibition of 'fraud' 'in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security,' which can be read no more broadly than
the statutory prohibition of 'deception' 'in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security,' may extend to breaches of
fiduciary duty involving the misappropriation of confidential
information from one who is neither a purchaser nor a seller of
securities, or otherwise connected with a securities transaction.,'
' 61
The court, following the Supreme Court's precedent in Santa
Fe Industries, stated that "deception," for purposes of liability
under section 10(b), is either a material misrepresentation or a
failure to disclose material information in violation of a duty to do
so. 162 It also noted that breach of a fiduciary duty, by itself, does
not constitute a violation of section 10(b).163 Applying these rules
to the misappropriation theory, the court determined the following:
Although the misappropriation of information in breach of a
fiduciary duty may, in a generalized sense, involve deception, in
most cases such misappropriation will not constitute a "misrep-
157. See id. at 945. "Absent guidance from the Supreme Court, the language of [rule
10b-5], if not the statute, could plausibly accommodate the misappropriation theory." Id.
158. See id. at 944-59.
159. Id. at 945. "Manipulation and deception are the touchstones of section 10(b)
liability: 'The language of Sec. 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any
conduct not involving manipulation or deception."' Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)).
160. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 945 (citing Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476).
161. Id. at 946 (citations omitted).
162. See id.
163. See id. (citing Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 472). The court further noted that the
Supreme Court recently affirmed the tenet that section 10(b) "deception" refers to only
misrepresentations or omissions of material information. See id. (referring to the Supreme




resentation" or "nondisclosure." In any event, by its own
terms, the misappropriation theory does not even require
deception, but rather allows the imposition of liability upon the
mere breach of a fiduciary relationship or similar relationship
of trust and confidence. Such a theory obviously cannot be
squared with the holding of Santa Fe Industries that a breach of
fiduciary duty, even in connection with a purchase or sale of
securities, does not give rise to liability under section 10(b),
absent deception."
The court also examined the fiduciary duty element of the
misappropriation theory.165 The Fourth Circuit, in departing from
the other circuit court decisions regarding the misappropriation
theory, followed the precedent established by the Supreme Court
in Chiarella and Dirks concerning the class intended to be protect-
ed by section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the purchasers and sellers of
securities.1 "6 The court noted that the Supreme Court had inter-
preted section 10(b) as requiring a "relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction." '167 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court had stated that a duty to disclose does not arise
"merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his
position in the market.""16 Applying these rules to the misappro-
priation theory, the court determined as follows:
Even if the misappropriation theory required deception, or
deception were otherwise present, the theory still does not
require deception violative of a duty of fair representation or
disclosure owed to a market participant, i.e., deception in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities. Section 10(b),
it bears repeating, reaches only deception of persons with some
connection to, or some interest or stake in, an actual or
proposed purchase or sale of securities. The misappropriation
of information from an individual who is in no way connected
to, or even interested in, securities is simply not the kind of
164. Id. at 949 (citations and footnotes omitted).
165. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946-47.
166. See id. (stating that "[tihe Court has left no doubt that the principal concern of
section 10(b) is the protection of purchasers and sellers of securities"); see also Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC, see supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States, see supra notes
59-74 and accompanying text.
167. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 947 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230).
168. Id. (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58).
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conduct with which the securities laws, as presently written, are
concerned. In essence, the misappropriation theory disregards
the specific statutory requirement of deception, in favor of a
requirement of a mere fiduciary breach, and then artificially
divides into two discrete requirements-a fiduciary breach and
a purchase or sale of securities-the single indivisible require-
ment of deception upon the purchaser or seller of securities, or
upon some other person intimately linked with or affected by
a securities transaction. In so doing, the theory effectively
eliminates the requirement that a person in some way connect-
ed to a securities transaction be deceived, allowing conviction
not only where the "defrauded" person has no connection with
a securities transaction, but where no investor or market
participant has been deceived. In allowing the statute's unitary
requirement to be satisfied by any fiduciary breach (whether or
not it entails deceit) that is followed by a securities transaction
(whether or not the breach is of a duty owed to a purchaser or
seller of securities, or to another market participant), the
misappropriation theory transforms section 10(b) from a rule
intended to govern and protect relations among market
participants who are owed duties under the securities laws into
a federal common law governing and protecting any and all
trust relationships. 69
The Fourth Circuit, in adhering to the text of the statutes and the
legislative intent, declined to sustain liability under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 based on the misappropriation theory.17°
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. O'Hagan,171 joined the
Fourth Circuit in rejecting the misappropriation theory of liability
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.172 The Supreme Court
appreciated the significance of the division that had been created
among the circuit courts and granted certiorari to resolve the
dispute and provide closure to the issue of whether liability under
169. Id. at 949-50 (footnotes omitted).
170. See id. at 959. The court stated:
[I]n securities law, as in all areas of the law, our perceptions of what is wise or fair
are ultimately of no relevance. In the end, we, as judges, no less than anyone else,
are bound by the actual prohibitions enacted by Congress. It is adherence to this
fundamental limitation on our own authority that leads us to conclude that, as
ignoble as Bryan's conduct was, it simply was not conduct that is prohibited by
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
Id.; see also supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial branch's tendency
to reach beyond statutory language and legislative intent in rendering decisions).
171. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
172. See generally id. at 612.
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section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 can be premised upon the misappro-
priation theory.'73
V. United States v. O'Hagan
The defendant/respondent, James Herman O'Hagan, was a
partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney.174 Dorsey &
Whitney represented Grand Metropolitan PLC with regard to a
potential tender offer for the Pillsbury Company.'75 O'Hagan,
who did not participate in the Grand Metropolitan representation,
purchased Pillsbury common stock and equity call option contracts
for Pillsbury common stock.'76 After Grand Metropolitan public-
ly announced its tender offer for Pillsbury common stock, the price
of Pillsbury common stock soared from thirty-nine dollars per share
to sixty dollars per share.'77 O'Hagan sold his Pillsbury common
stock and call options and recognized a profit of more than
$4,300,000.178 The SEC commenced an investigation into O'Ha-
gan's trading activities in Pillsbury securities which culminated in
an indictment for, inter alia, violations of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. 79 The indictment charged O'Hagan with the violations for
defrauding his employer, Dorsey & Whitney, and his client, Grand
Metropolitan, by using-for his personal advantage-material,
nonpublic information regarding the Pillsbury tender offer to
purchase and sell securities.t8 A federal jury convicted O'Hagan
on fifty-seven different violations including those under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5.'8' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed each of O'Hagan's convictions.1
8 2
A. The Majority
The Supreme Court commenced its decision with an overview
of the traditional and misappropriation theories of insider trading
173. See generally O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2199.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. A call option gives the contract holder the right to purchase a specified
amount of the underlying security, at a specified price, for a specified time period. 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DIcTIONARY OF MONEY & FINANCE 83 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992).





182. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 628 (8th Cir. 1996).
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liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5."8' It then moved to
an examination of the "deception" element of section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory." 4  The Court
premised the deception on a breach of fiduciary duty.185  The
Court determined that "[a] fiduciary who '[pretends] loyalty to the
principal while secretly converting the principal's information for
personal gain,' 'dupes' or defrauds the principal." '86 The Court
also looked to its decision in Carpenter187 as support for its
interpretation of "deception. 1 88  In Carpenter, the Court recog-
nized that a company's confidential information constitutes
property in which the company has exclusive rights.'89 The
Court, in Carpenter, surmised that the misappropriation of such
183. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2206. The Court recognized that under the traditional
theory of insider trading liability,
[Section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate insider tiades in the
securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.
Trading on such information qualifies as a "deceptive device" under [sec.] 10(b),
we have affirmed, because "a relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between
the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained
confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation." That
relationship, we recognized, "gives rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain from
trading] because of the 'necessity of preventing a corporate insider
from ... tak[ing] unfair advantage of ... uninformed ... stockholders."'
Id. at 2207 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980)). It should be
noted that the Court used the phrase "on the basis of" material, nonpublic information
rather than "while in possession" of such information. See supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
The Court also recognized that, under the misappropriation theory of insider trading
liability:
[A] person commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction, and
thereby violates [sec.]10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source
of the information. Under this theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use
of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of
loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that
information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between
company insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropria-
tion theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who
entrusted him with access to the confidential information.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
184. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
185. See id. (referring to Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 n.14 (1983)).
186. Id. (quoting Aldave, supra note 96, at 119).
187. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
188. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
189. See id. (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25-27).
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material, nonpublic information, in violation of a fiduciary duty,
constituted fraudulent conduct.19 °
The Court concluded its discussion of the "deception" element
with an egregious error and an apparent manifestation that the
Court did comprehend the legislative intent of section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5.191 The Court determined that the principal could
absolve himself or herself from liability if he or she discloses to the
source of the information that he or she intends to purchase or sell
securities based on such information.
192
[F]ull disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation
theory: Because the deception essential to the misappropriation
theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of the informa-
tion, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade
on the nonpublic information, there is no "deceptive device" and
thus no [Section] 10(b) violation .... 193
After its discussion of "deception," the Court transitioned to an
examination of the "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" element of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 under the
misappropriation theory.194
The Court determined that the "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" element of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 is satisfied under the misappropriation theory because
the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary
gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure
to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell
securities. The securities transaction and the breach of duty
thus coincide. This is so even though the person or entity
defrauded is not the other party to the trade, but is, instead, the
source of the nonpublic information.'95
190. See id. (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27).
191. See discussion infra notes 218-21 (discussing the Court's misconception regarding the
foreclosure of insider trading liability under the misappropriation theory through disclosure
to the source of the information).
192. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
193. Id. at 2209 (emphasis added). The Court noted that the principal, however, may be
liable for violations under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty. See id; see also infra
notes 263-79 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of absolving liability upon
disclosure to the source of the information).
194. See id. at 2209-11.
195. Id. at 2209.
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The Court confined the violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5 to misappropriation of information and, in dicta, declined to
apply the misappropriation theory to the misappropriation of
funds. 96 The Court distinguished funds from information because
funds
would have a value to the malefactor apart from their use in a
securities transaction, and the fraud would be complete as soon
as the money was obtained. ... its misappropriation may thus
be viewed as sufficiently detached from a subsequent securities
transaction that [Section] 10(b)'s "in connection with" require-
ments would not be met."9
The Court emphasized the fact that the statutory language of
section 10(b) requires deception "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security" and does not specify that the deception be
of an identifiable purchaser or seller.198 The Court also correctly
noted that a fundamental purpose of the Exchange Act is to instill
confidence in investors and promote honest markets. 99 It did
not, however, contemplate how the holding in O'Hagan would
conflict with the objectives of the Exchange Act. The Supreme
Court, by holding that a fiduciary can foreclose liability under the
misappropriation theory by disclosing to the source the intent to
trade on the material, nonpublic information, failed to consider that
the investing public is still defrauded by the fiduciary's purchase or
sale in the market.2" According to the Supreme Court, although
196. See id. The United States acknowledged, in its appellate brief to the Supreme
Court, that "[tihe misappropriation theory would not ... apply to a case in which a person
defrauded a bank into giving him a loan or embezzled cash from another, and then used the
proceeds of the misdeed to purchase securities." Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 24,
n.13, O'Hagan (No. 96-842)).
197. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (quoting and citing Brief for United States at 24, n.13,
O'Hagan (No. 96-842)).
198. Id. at 2209-10. See also supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (expounding that
the legislative intent of the Exchange Act focused on the protection of the market
participants and not on the "victim" of a breach of a fiduciary duty).
199. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210. "Although informational disparity is inevitable in
the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market
where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law." Id.
The Supreme Court, however, slighted other potential sources of liability in classic misappro-
priation scenarios: the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (1994); section 14(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994) and rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 14e-3 (1996) (in the context of a tender
offer); common law fraud; and, by its own admission, state law violations for breach of a duty
of loyalty. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
200. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208-14.
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disclosure to the source forecloses liability under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5, it may subject the fiduciary to a violation under state
law for breach of a duty of loyalty.201 As the Court correctly
noted, a fundamental purpose of the Exchange Act is to protect
investors; nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not promote this
objective as it rendered section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 inoperative
where the fiduciary has informed the source of the confidential
inforamtion of his or her intent to trade on such confidential
information °. 2' Notwithstanding the disclosure to the source, the
investing public remains at an informational disadvantage and
subject to the precise deceptive practices that Congress sought to
prohibit when it enacted the Exchange Act.
The Court concluded, based on the foregoing, that the
misappropriation theory is a valid basis of liability under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 because it satisfies the statutory requirements
of "deception" conducted "in connection with the purchase and
sale of any security., 203 The Court then attempted to establish
that the misappropriation theory comports with Supreme Court
precedent.0 4
The Eighth Circuit, in O'Hagan, maintained that the Supreme
Court's decisions in Chiarella, Dirks, and Central Bank asserted
that section 10(b) liability cannot be based on a duty owed to the
source of the information.0 5 The Supreme Court, in O'Hagan,
interpreted such Supreme Court precedent contrary to the Eighth
Circuit. 6  The Court first revisited its decision in Chiarella °7
In Chiarella, the Court stated that section 10(b) liability "is
premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust
and confidence between parties to a transaction," and, as such,
liability under section 10(b) cannot be predicated on a duty to a
person who is not a purchaser or seller in the transaction.2 8
Since the Supreme Court, in Chiarella, did not directly address the
201. See id.
202. See id. at 2210.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 22110-14. Specifically, the Court revisited its decisions in Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646 (1983), and Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
205. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996).
206. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210-14.
207. 445 U.S. at 222; see also supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text (reviewing the
Chiarella decision).
208. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
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validity of the misappropriation theory because the issue was not
submitted to the jury, the Court, in O'Hagan, did not grant ample
credence to the Eighth Circuit's reliance on this excerpt from
Chiarella.
29
The Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court also clashed over
the interpretation of Dirks.2 t° In Dirks, the Court, as cited by the
Eighth Circuit, stated that "[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the
relationship between the parties ... and not merely from one's
ability to acquire information because of his position in the
market., 211 Since the facts in Dirks established that there was no
expectation by the source that the information would remain
confidential and that the information was not obtained unlawfully,
the Supreme Court, in O'Hagan, determined that Dirks presented
''no suggestion that a person who gains nonpublic information
through misappropriation in breach of a fiduciary duty escapes
[section] 10(b) liability when, without alerting the source, he trades
on the information., 21 2 In so determining, the Supreme Court, in
O'Hagan, fabricated a factual excuse to disregard an established
rule of law.
Finally, the Court addressed the Eighth Circuit's reliance on
Central Bank as support for rejecting the misappropriation
theory.213  The Court, in Central Bank, held that a "private
plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under
[section] 10(b)" and that any "person or entity ... who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omis-
sion) on which the purchaser or seller of securities relies may be
liable as a primary violator under [rule] 10b-5, assuming ... the
requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.
21 4
Based on the Court's holding in Central Bank, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that section 10(b) covers only statements or omissions on
which the purchasers and sellers relied.215 The Supreme Court,
209. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212. "The statements highlighted by the Eight Circuit,
in short, appear in an opinion carefully leaving for future resolution the validity of the
misappropriation theory, and therefore cannot be read to foreclose that theory." Id.
210. See id. at 2212-13; see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
211. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Dirks, 463
U.S. at 657-58).
212. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665.
213. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2213.
214. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 191 (1994).
215. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 619.
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in O'Hagan, provided a different interpretation of the excerpts
from the Central Bank decision; the Court "sought only to clarify
that secondary actors, although not subject to aiding and abetting
liability, remain subject to primary liability under [section] 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 for certain conduct.,
21 6
After establishing the validity of the misappropriation theory
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 and refuting the Eighth Circuit's
interpretations of certain Supreme Court precedents, the Supreme
Court concluded by reversing the Eighth Circuit.27
B. The Dissent
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, authored
a Machiavellian dissent.2 8  The Dissent first took exception to
the Majority's conclusion that mere embezzlement of confidential
information satisfies the "in connection with" requirement under
section 10(b). 219  The Majority determined that "the fiduciary's
fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential
information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses
the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities
transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide., 2 ' The Dissent,
however, correctly elucidated that "[t]he touchstone required for an
embezzlement to be 'use[d] or employ[ed], in connection with' a
securities transaction is not merely that it 'coincide' with, or be
consummated by, the transaction, but that it is necessarily and only
consummated by the transaction.""22
The United States conceded that the misappropriation of funds
that were used to purchase or sell a security would not be encom-
passed in the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.222 The United States distin-
guished the misappropriation of confidential information, which it
argued constituted a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, from
the misappropriation of funds, which it conceded did not constitute
such a violation. This distinction was based on the fallacious
reasoning that the confidential information could only be used for
216. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2212.
217. See id. at 2214.
218. See id. at 2220 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 2221.
220. Id. at 2209.
221. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2222.
222. See id. (citing Brief for United States at 24, n.13, O'Hagan (No. 96-842)).
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pecuniary gain in a securities transaction, thus constituting a
sufficient nexus. 223 The Dissent then noted that O'Hagan could
have financially benefitted from the confidential information
without purchasing securities: "He could have sold it to a news-
paper for publication" or "he could have given or sold the
information to Pillsbury itself."'224 The Dissent pointed out that
such activities would have deprived Grand Metropolitan of its
exclusive right to use such confidential information and would
constitute embezzlement of Grand Metropolitan's property.
225
Under any theory of liability, however, these activities would
not violate [section] 10(b) and, according to the [United States']
monetary embezzlement analogy, these possibilities are
sufficient to preclude a violation under the misappropriation
theory even where the informational property was used for
securities trading .... If the relevant test under the "in
connection with" language is whether the fraudulent act is
necessarily tied to a securities transaction, then the misappropri-
ation of confidential information used to trade no more violates
[section] 10(b) than does the misappropriation of funds used to
trade.226
The Dissent subsequently attacked the Majority's policy
considerations. 227 The Majority maintained that the misappropri-
ation theory promotes fair and honest markets and investor
confidence. 228  Although such policy considerations were clearly
integral to Congress' enactment of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, 229 as the Dissent noted, the Majority contradicts
itself in the face of such policy considerations.23 The majority
opinion states that "if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he
plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no 'deceptive
device' and thus no 10(b) violation. '231  Consequently, the
Majority's holding is quite troubling.
223. See id. at 2223.
224. Id. (citations omitted).
225. See id.
226. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2223-24.
227. See id. at 2225.
228. See id. at 2212.
229. See supra notes 19-32 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act).
230. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2225.
231. Id. at 2209.
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According to the Majority, if the fiduciary discloses to the
source of the confidential information that he or she intends to
purchase or sell securities based on such information, the fiduciary
is insulated from insider trading liability under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5. The market participant on the other side of the
securities transaction remains at a disadvantage because he or she
is not privy to the same confidential information. Therefore, as the
Dissent correctly points out, under the rules of law set forth by the
Majority, the misappropriation theory vastly expands the scope of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 without promoting the legislative
intent behind such statutes.
VI. O'Hagan and Beyond
A. The Misappropriation Theory Is Inconsistent with Section
10(b), Rule lOb-5, and Legislative Intent
The Supreme Court has stated that the starting point in every
decision involving the construction of a statute is the language of
the statute itself. 32 The language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,
however, is too broad and "notoriously vague" to provide conclu-
sive evidence regarding the validity of the misappropriation theory
thereunder.233  Although the Exchange Act was enacted by
Congress, inter alia, to proscribe insider trading activities, section
16 of the Exchange Act, not section 10(b), was the vehicle intended
to achieve such means. 234  Section 10(b) was a device intended by
232. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,197 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
756 (1975).
233. See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 448 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) ("It is
inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope
of conduct prohibited by the statutory text.").
234. See supra notes 19-32 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the federal
securities laws including section 10(b)). Section 16 of the Exchange Act was intended to
proscribe insider trading activities. See C. EDWARD FLETCHER, MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF INSIDER TRADING 45 (1991); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13 (1934) (discussing
section 16 and its prohibitions on insider trading activities); S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 3-4 (1934)
(discussing insider trading activities). Section 16, in pertinent part, states:
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted
security) which is registered pursuant to [section 12], or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of
such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date of a
registration statement filed pursuant to [section 12(g)], or within ten days after he
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Congress to prohibit the use of manipulation in the context of a
securities transaction requiring more than the mere presentation of
a breach of a fiduciary duty.235 The deceptive practices sought to
be prohibited by section 10(b) included wash sales, matched orders,
and other transactions intended to manipulate the price of any
security; such deceptive practices are not regulated by the misap-
becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the [S.E.C.]
(and, if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the
exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the
beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month
thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall
file with the [S.E.C.] (and if such security is registered on a national securities
exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indicating his ownership
at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have
occurred during such calendar month.
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such security
was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part
of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period
exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any
security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail
or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two
years after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be
construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both
at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security
involved, or any transaction or transactions which the [S.E.C.] by rules and
regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
subsection.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any such beneficial owner, director, or officer, directly
or indirectly, to sell any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted
security), if the person selling the security or his principal (1) does not own the
security sold, or (2) if owning the security, does not deliver it against such sale
within twenty days thereafter, or does not within five days after such sale deposit
it in the mails or other usual channels of transportation; but no person shall be
deemed to have violated this subsection if he proves that notwithstanding the
exercise of good faith he was unable to make such delivery or deposit within such
time, or that to do so would cause undue inconvenience or expense.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994).
235. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (analyzing the Bryan court's
discussion of the "deception" element of section 10(b)); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234
(stating that the text of section 10(b) creates the parameters of prohibited activities);
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199 (stating that section 10(b) should be given its "commonly
accepted meaning").
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propriation theory of insider trading liability under section
10(b). 236  The language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 and the
legislative intent evinced by Congress in enacting the Exchange
Act, strongly support the conclusion that section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 should not be used to regulate conduct in the context of the
misappropriation theory.
B. The Misappropriation Theory Is Inconsistent with Supreme
Court Precedent
The Supreme Court had engaged in, prior to its decision in
O'Hagan, "principled line drawing." 7  The results of such line
drawing indicate that the misappropriation theory cannot form a
valid basis of insider trading liability under section 10(b) or rule
10b-5.238 First, the Supreme Court stated that liability under
section 10(b) cannot be extended beyond the scope of conduct
regulated by its statutory language. 39  Second, the Supreme
Court defined the scope of conduct regulated by section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5.240
The misappropriation theory contradicts the Court's holding in
Santa Fe Industries.241 In Santa Fe Industries, the Court held that
a mere breach of fiduciary duty, without manipulation or deception,
236. See S. REP. No. 73-792, at 3-4; see also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 ("In 10(b),
Congress prohibited manipulative or deceptive acts in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities.") (emphasis added); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226 (noting that "Section 10(b) was
designed as a catchall clause to prevent fraudulent practices") (emphasis added); Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (stating that section 10(b) does not provide
any "indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception"); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 (stating that section 10(b) requires the "intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud"); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733.
237. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (stating that courts should engage in
"principled line drawing" when interpreting a statute).
238. See supra notes 59-92 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella and Dirks); see
also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 164; Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 462.
239. As discussed above, the language of the statutes does not provide a valid basis for
imposing liability under section 10(b) based on the misappropriation theory. See supra notes
223-28; see also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173, 175 ("Our consideration of statutory duties,
especially in cases interpreting § 10(b), establishes that the statutory text controls the
definition of conduct covered by § 10(b)."); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234 ("As we have
emphasized before, the [Exchange Act] cannot be read 'more broadly than its language and
the statutory scheme reasonably permit."') (citations omitted).
240. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 164; Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 222.
241. 430 U.S. at 462.
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cannot constitute a violation of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5.242 In
so holding, the Court intentionally avoided the creation of a
"federal fiduciary standard" that covered "the corporate uni-
verse."243  The misappropriation theory, however, does not
comport with the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe Industries.
The misappropriation theory regulates the breach of fiduciary
relationships or other relationships of trust and confidence, in direct
contradiction of Santa Fe Industries 4.2 ' Although the Court in
O'Hagan attempted to rationalize the mere breach of a fiduciary
duty as "deception" under section 10(b), the persuasiveness of its
argument, and the authority on which this proposition was
grounded, was devoid of any logical substance.245
The misappropriation theory also contradicts the Supreme
Court's holding in Chiarella.24 In Chiarella, the Court held that
section 10(b) liability "is premised upon a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction," and, as such, section 10(b) liability cannot be predi-
cated on a duty to a person who is not a party to the securities
transaction. 247  The misappropriation theory ignores the Court's
holding in Chiarella because the misappropriation theory asserts
liability for a breach of a duty to the source of the confidential
information rather than a breach of a fiduciary duty or relationship
242. See id. at 473-74 ("[T]he claim of fraud and fiduciary breach ... states a cause of
action under any part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as
'manipulative' or 'deceptive' within the meaning of the statute."). Additionally, the Court
stated that "[w]hen a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and decep-
tion ... and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to
extend the scope of the statute." Id. at 473 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 214 (1976)).
243. Id. at 477-80, (quoting William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974)). The Court stated that Congress did not
intend that section 10(b) "regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal
corporate mismanagement." Id. at 479 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)).
244. See id.
245. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-08 (1997); see also supra notes
178-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in O'Hagan relating to the
"deception" element of section 10(b)).
246. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see also supra notes 59-74 and
accompanying text (discussing the Chiarella decision).
247. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added). The Court noted that, although section




of trust and confidence with the corresponding party to the
securities transaction.
The Court in Chiarella further noted that there is no
general duty between all participants in market transactions to
forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information.
Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically from
the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific
relationship between two parties should not be undertaken
absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent .... [N]o
such evidence emerges from the language or legislative history
of 10(b).24
Therefore, in accordance with the Court's holding in Chiarella, a
person may only be liable for a violation of section 10(b) or rule
10b-5 if such person is an agent or fiduciary of the corporation in
which such person purchased or sold securities or such person has
an independent relationship of trust and confidence with the
corresponding purchaser or seller to the securities transaction.24 9
Since the misappropriation theory can impose liability on a person
who is not an agent or fiduciary of the corporation in which such
person purchased or sold securities or a person who does not have
an independent relationship of trust and confidence with the corre-
sponding purchaser or seller in the securities transaction, the
misappropriation theory directly contradicts the Court's holding in
Chiarella.
The misappropriation theory also conflicts with the Supreme
Court's holding in Dirks.25 ° In Dirks, the Court reaffirmed its
decision in Chiarella by emphasizing that "a duty [to disclose] arises
from the relationship between parties ... and not merely from
248. Id. at 233.
249. See id. at 232. The Court stated:
No duty could arise from [defendant's] relationship with the sellers of the target
company's securities, for [defendant] had no prior dealings with them. He was not
their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt
with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
Id. at 232-33. The corresponding party to the securities transaction is rarely, if ever, readily
identifiable if the transaction is facilitated through a secuities exchange. If, however, the
transaction occurs between the parties without a securities exchange serving as an
intermediary, obviously the parties are readily identifiable. Unfortunately, from an
administrative and enforcement standpoint, securities transactions are predominately facili-
tated through a securities exchange.
250. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); see also supra notes 75-92 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's decision in Dirks).
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one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the
market. 2 51  Although the Court only referred to "parties,"
instead of "parties to a transaction" as in Chiarella, the Court
intended to affirm its holding in Chiarella based on the same
underlying legal principles. 252  Furthermore, the Court stressed
that even if section 10(b) was construed to reach beyond parties to
a securities transaction, a violation of section 10(b) "may be found
only where there is 'intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors.'', 253  The misappropriation theory,
by permitting a violation of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 to be based
on a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to a person other than a party
to the securities transaction or to a fiduciary of the corporation
whose securities were purchased or sold, clearly extends beyond the
lines drawn by the Supreme Court in Chiarella and Dirks.
Finally, the misappropriation theory conflicts with the Supreme
Court's decision in Central Bank.254 In Central Bank, the Court
held that
[a]ny person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank,
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material
misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5,
assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under
Rule 10b-5 are met.255
In addition, the Court reestablished the tenet that section 10(b)
does not reach a breach of a fiduciary duty without evidence of
manipulation or deception. 6
The Supreme Court's decisions in Santa Fe Industries,
Chiarella, Dirks, and Central Bank have established limitations
under which insider trading liability can be premised under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5. A violation under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5
may only be asserted against an insider of a corporation who owes
251. Id. at 657-58 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33 n.14).
252. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
Court "gave no indication that it intended to retreat from Chiarella's holding"). To the
contrary, the Dirks Court stated early in its opinion that the duty to disclose crafted in
Chiarella was applicable only to the corporation whose securities were being traded.
253. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 n.23 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199
(1976)).
254. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
255. Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
256. See id. at 174.
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a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of such corporation, or against
a person with an independent duty to the corresponding party to
the transaction if he or she purchases or sells a security based on
material, nonpublic information. The misappropriation theory, by
allowing a cause of action to be asserted for a breach of any
fiduciary duty and a subsequent purchase or sale of a security
based on misappropriated information obtained as a result of such
breach, violates this established rule of law.
In light of the Court's established section 10(b) jurisprudence
in Santa Fe Industries, Chiarella, Dirks, and Central Bank, the
misappropriation theory should have been rejected by the Court in
O'Hagan. Instead, the Court in O'Hagan determined that the
conduct of defendants, such as James O'Hagan, whose conduct was
admittedly unethical, should be held criminally liable under the
federal securities laws without proper recognition of established
Supreme Court precedent.257
C. Fiduciary Duty
The Supreme Court, in Central Bank, stated that liability under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is "an area that demands certainty and
predictability, 258 and that the judiciary should not be relegated to
rendering decisions "'on an ad hoc basis, offering little predictive
value' to those who provide services to participants in the securities
business., 259  Upholding the misappropriation theory as a valid
basis of liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 has created the
uncertainty that the Supreme Court has sought to avoid. The
Court in O'Hagan did not attempt to limit the type of fiduciary
duty or relationship of trust and confidence, the breach of which
would constitute "deception" under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5.26°
257. See Shawn J. Lindquist, Note, United States v. O'Hagan: The Eighth Circuit Throws
the Second Strike to the Misappropriation Theory of Rule 10b-5 Liability, 1997 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 197, 233 (1997) ("In cases like United States v. O'Hagan, it is tempting for courts to use
the misappropriation theory to broaden the scope of liability in order to reach conduct that
one's intuition may suggest is improper."); Kenny & Thebaut, supra note 5, at 185-211; see
also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, GROWTH OF THE LAW 110 (1924) (recognizing that there is
an "overmastering need of certainty in the transactions of commercial life").
258. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)).
259. Id. (quoting Pinter, 486 U.S. at 652).
260. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995) (The misappropriation
theory protects "the source of the non-public information, and the source need not be a
purchaser or seller of securities, be affiliated with a purchaser or seller, or be in any way
connected to or even interested in the purchase or sale of securities.") (citation omitted).
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The judiciary will be forced to apply the misappropriation theory
on an "ad hoc" basis based on whether the court subjectively
determines that the particular breach of fiduciary duty or relation-
ship of trust and confidence constitutes "deception" under section
10(b) or rule 10b-5. As the Second Circuit noted in Chestman,
[t]ethered to the field of shareholder relations, fiduciary
obligations arise within a narrow, principled sphere. The
existence of fiduciary duties in other common law settings,
however, is anything but clear. Our Rule 10b-5 precedents
under the misappropriation theory, moreover, provide little
guidance with respect to the question of fiduciary breach.26'
The misappropriation theory undermines the Supreme Court's
objective of providing certainity and predictability in this area of
the law. In essence, the misappropriation theory has created "a
shifting and highly fact-oriented disposition of the issue of who may
[be liable for] a damages claim for violation of Rule 10b-5."262
D. Disclosure to Source
If the Supreme Court's exchange of its "judicial robes for a
cleric's robe or a legislator's vote" '263 by upholding the validity of
the misappropriation theory under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 had
not butchered the textual fibers of the federal securities laws
enough, it further muddled this area of the law-thus thwarting the
legislative intent behind the law-by absolving the misappropriator
if he or she discloses to the source of the confidential information
that he or she intends to purchase or sell securities based on such
confidential information."6 More specifically, the Supreme Court
held:
261. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
1004 (1992).
262. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975)). See also Chestman, 947 F.2d at 564 ("[C]aselaw establishes that
some trading on material nonpublic information is illegal and some is not. The line between
the two is less than clear."); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733 n.5 ("[Tihe wording of
10(b) ... is surely badly strained when construed to provide a cause of action, not to
purchasers and sellers of securities, but to the world at large.").
263. See Kenny & Thebault, supra note 5, at 209-10.
264. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2209 (1997); see also supra notes 185-
87,218-22 and accompanying text (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions' viewpoint




[F]ull disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation
theory: Because the deception essential to the misappropriation
theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of the informa-
tion, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade
on the nonpublic information, there is no "deceptive device" and
thus no [sec.] 10(b) violation ... 265
The Court, presumably, upheld the misappropriation the-
ory-even though the statutory language, legislative intent, and
prevailing Supreme Court precedent are devoid of any indication
of its validity-because it provides the government with one more
weapon in its arsenal to combat insider trading activities. The
Court, in the same decision that upheld the misappropriation
theory and arguably provided market participants with additional
protection against insider trading infractions, established a legal
principle that completely disregards the protection of the same
market participants it sought to protect.
According to the Court, if the misappropriator discloses to the
source of the material, nonpublic information that he or she intends
to purchase or sell a security based on such information, the
misappropriator cannot be liable for a violation under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5. 2" The market participant on the other side of the
securities transaction, however, has been damaged nonetheless.
The misappropriator is trading the security based on information
that the corresponding market participant could not have obtained
in the ordinary course of his or her due diligence; this places the
corresponding market participant at an unfair advantage. In
O'Hagan, the Court maintained that, in accordance with the
legislative purpose of the Exchange Act, the misappropriation
theory promotes fair and honest markets and investor confi-
dence.267 Yet, with the ink from the same instrument that ac-
knowledged that the misappropriation theoy was intended to
protect investors, the Court has created an ironic situation where
the class of persons sought to be protected by its decision are not
afforded protection if the misappropriator discloses his or her
intentions to the source of the confidential information.
The Court attempted to diminish the importance of the
"absolution by disclosure to the source" situation by ironically
265. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (emphasis added).
266. See id.
267. See id. at 2210.
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pointing out the existence of state law remedies for breach of a
duty of loyalty.268  The irony of the Court's observation stems
from the fact that the same state law remedies are available, and
more appropriate, in the misappropriation theory context regardless
of whether the intention to purchase or sell a security has been
disclosed to the source. In other words, the unethical conduct
proscribed by the misappropriation theory can be punished under
state law statutes for a breach of fiduciary duty as well as other
common law remedies such as fraud; therefore, the misappropriator
will not escape unscathed. The availability of such alternative
actions should have prevented the Supreme Court from re-drawing
the boundry lines within which liability under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 may be premised in order to achieve what it perceived
as justice. This is especially true where the analysis employed in
the decision cannot be supported by and, in some instances, contra-
dicts the statutory language and legislative intent of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 and established Supreme Court precedent.
E. Civil Remedies Affected
The Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan has ramifications
beyond those contemplated by the Court in upholding the misap-
propriation theory. While O'Hagan broadened the scope of
liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, it diminished the civil
remedies afforded investors under the federal securities laws.
One such civil remedy that will be affected by the O'Hagan
decision is section 20A of the Exchange Act.269  Although the
misappropriation theory had been upheld by the some circuit courts
as a valid basis for asserting criminal liability under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5, civil actions under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
based on the misappropriation theory have been rejected.27° In
268. Some states, such as California, have statutes that proscribe the purchase or sale of
a security by any person "whose relationship to the issuer gives him access, directly or indi-
rectly, to material information about the issuer not generally available" and such transaction
"would significantly affect the market price of the security ... is not generally available to
the public, and ... is not intended to be so available, unless he has reason to believe that
the person selling to or buying from him is also in possession of the information." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25402 (West 1977); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.402 (West 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-32 (Michie 1991); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 1609(b) (McKinney 1984);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-406 (West 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-31A-101(b) (Michie
1991).
269. Secuities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994).
270. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
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1988, Congress enacted the Insider Trading Act of 1988 to, inter
alia, "overturn court cases which have precluded recovery for
plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is premised upon the
misappropriation theory., 271 As a result of the Insider Trading
Act of 1988, section 20A was added to the Exchange Act.272
Section 20A(a) of the Exchange Act provides a civil remedy for
"contemporaneous traders, 273 against any person that violates a
provision of the Exchange Act or any rule promulgated thereunder
while such person is purchasing or selling a security based on
material, nonpublic information.274
One element that a plaintiff must prove to recover damages
under section 20A is that a violation of a provision in the Exchange
Act, or a rule promulgated thereunder, has occurred.275 The only
two potential violations under the Exchange Act that may trigger
a valid cause of action under section 20A are section 10(b)/rule
10b-5 and section 14(e)/rule 14e-3. 276  A violation of rule 14e-3
occurs if a person purchases or sells a security while in possession
271. H. REP. No. 100-910, at 26 (1988).
272. Id.
273. Although the term "contemporaneous trader" has not been defined by Congress,
at least one court has held that the term should be defined to mean individuals who have
purchased or sold a security anonymously on the open market and should not be defined to
include direct, face-to-face transactions. See Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co. v. Kapoor, 932 F.
Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1996); see also Feldman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 90C5887, 1994 WL 160115
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (allowing allegations that plaintiff purchased the securities within one to four
business days of defendant's illicit sale but rejecting allegations of transactions that occurred
months apart); In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 836 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(stating that the purchase of securities within five days of defendant's sales were contempora-
neous); Colby v. Hologic, Inc. 817 F. Supp. 204 (D. Mass. 1993) (stating that the purchase
of securities eight days after the defendant's sale was not contemporaneous); In re Verifone
Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that a transaction is contemporaneous
if it is within a few days but it cannot be longer than a month).
274. Section 20A(a) states:
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material,
nonpublic information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of
securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased (where such violation
is based on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based on a
purchase of securities) securities of the same class.
15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a).
275. See id.
276. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (setting forth the text of rule 14e-3). The
Supreme Court, in O'Hagan, held that the SEC did not exceed its rulemaking authority
under section 14(e) when it promulgated rule 14e-3(a). See United States v. O'Hagan, 117
S. Ct. 2199, 2214-19 (1997).
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of material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer which
has been acquired from the offeror, the target company involved
in the tender offer, or an insider of either such company.
2 7
If, however, the person purchases or sells a security based on
material, nonpublic information that does not relate to a tender
offer, the plaintiff asserting a cause of action under section 20A will
attempt to rely on section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 for the the requisite
violation under the Exchange Act.278 If the factual situation
depicts a violation of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5 based on the
misaapropriation theory of insider trading liability, the Court's
decision in O'Hagan may present a troublesome issue for the
plaintiff. According to the Court in O'Hagan, "if the fiduciary
discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic
information, there is no 'deceptive device' and thus no 10(b)
violation; '' 279 therefore, if the defendant-misappropriator discloses
to the source his or her intent to purchase or sell a security based
on the confidential information, there has been no violation of
section 10(b) or rule 10b-5. Thus, the plaintiff may not assert a
private cause of action under section 20A because there has been
no violation of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5. In an insider trading
context (outside of a tender offer situation), the Court's holding in
O'Hagan forecloses the ability to assert a cause of action under
section 20A against a misappropriator of material, nonpublic
information if the misappropriator discloses to the source of such
information his or her intent to trade on such information. As a
result, the Court has detracted from those protections afforded to
investors under federal securities laws.
277. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1994).
278. Although a review of numerous court decisions has revealed that a significant
number of actions brought in insider trading scenarios are in the context of a tender offer,
thus invoking the ability to claim a violation under section 14e and rule 14-e3 (see, e.g.,
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2199; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); United States
v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992); United States
v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983)), there are insider
trading scenarios that arise outside of the tender offer context. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646 (1983); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Carpen-
ter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).




In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when
a judge realizes that in the case before him his strongly held view
of justice, his political and moral imperative, is not embodied in
a statute or in any provision of the Constitution. He must then
choose between his version of justice and abiding by the
American form of government. Yet the desire to do justice,
whose nature seems to him obvious, is compelling, while the
concept of constitutional process is abstract, rather arid, and the
abstinence it counsels unsatisfying. To give in to temptation, this
one time, solves an urgent human problem, and a faint crack
appears in the American foundation. A judge has begun to rule
where a legislator should.280
The statutory language, legislative intent, and established
Supreme Court precedent surrounding section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
are all devoid of any legislative intent to proscribe conduct that is
actionable under the misappropriation theory. Instead of allowing
Congress to decide whether to codify the misappropriation theory,
the Supreme Court has chosen to disregard decades of established
legal principles to achieve a result that it views as fair and just; this
serves as an exemplary case where the "ends do not justify the
means." The effects of the Court's decision in O'Hagan will have
a lasting impression on federal securities laws and the class of
persons intended to be protected thereunder.
280. BORK, supra note 4, at 1 (emphasis added).
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